

# EMPIRICAL DETECTION OF POVERTY TRAPS AND UNNECESSARY DEPRIVATION<sup>\*</sup>

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## Abstract

A poverty trap exists when individuals are in equilibrium at a poor standard of living, and will not of their own volition escape poverty. Dynamic models of asset accumulation and occupational choice can create two types of poverty traps: conditional convergence poverty traps and unnecessary deprivation poverty traps. While distinguishing between these two types of chronic poverty is vital from a policy perspective, we show that existing empirical methods of detecting poverty traps are at best able to identify if multiple equilibria exist, but they are unable to distinguish between the two types of traps. In this paper, we fill this lacunae by proposing a threshold-based approach to detect poverty traps that distinguishes between conditional convergence and unnecessary deprivation traps. We emphasize the importance of shocks in distinguishing between the two types of traps. To illustrate the properties of ours and other approaches to test for poverty traps, we use a dynamic stochastic programming model to create simulated longitudinal data on households and their living standards. By manipulating the underlying parameters of the model, we create distinctive data generation processes characterized by no poverty traps, only one type of trap, or both types of traps coexisting in equilibrium. These different processes in turn allow us to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches.

**Keywords:** Poverty Traps, Well-being Dynamics

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# 1 Introduction

A poverty trap is broadly defined as a self-reinforcing mechanism that causes poverty to persist (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005). More specifically, a poverty trap exists when individuals are in equilibrium at a poor standard of living, and will not of their own volition accumulate their way out of poverty. Dynamic models of occupational choice, in which individuals choose between a low-paying, casual wage labor occupation and a potentially more remunerative entrepreneurial occupation that requires capital and business skill, show that two different types of persistent poverty can emerge and, importantly, coexist.<sup>1</sup>

The first type is the convergence of low skill individuals to the poor, wage labor occupation. Even if positively shocked with a capital grant, these individuals will optimally return to the poor standard of living. We refer to this kind of persistent poverty as resulting from a *conditional convergence poverty trap*. Individuals in this position always converge to the poor equilibrium conditional on their low skill level. The second type of persistent poverty that can emerge is when, in the absence of well-functioning credit markets, individuals who have the capacity to achieve the higher income entrepreneurial equilibrium end up at the impoverished casual wage labor equilibrium because of either low initial capital endowments or a history of negative shocks. Had they been born wealthier (or received a positive asset grant) and/or had a more favorable shock history, these individuals would end up in dynamic equilibrium at the non-poor, entrepreneurial occupation. Following Ikegami et al. (2019), we refer to this second type of persistently poor as unnecessarily deprived and caught in an *unnecessary deprivation poverty trap*.<sup>2</sup>

In this paper, we show that the approaches to detect poverty traps that have been developed and used to date in the literature (including S-shaped dynamics used in many such as Balboni et al. (2022) and Lybbert et al. (2004)) are ill-equipped to say if any detected multiple-equilibria reflect sorting into low and high equilibria based on skill (conditional convergence trap) or if there is evidence an unnecessary deprivation poverty trap—which is the type of trap usually implied. Using data drawn from a simulation of a flexible dynamic optimization process, we show that existing methods can detect multiple equilibria—when using relatively well-measured capital and with minimal heterogeneity.

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<sup>1</sup>See Buera (2009) and discussion in Barrett and Carter (2013). We provide a stylized model illustrating this co-existence in this paper.

<sup>2</sup>This is what is typically thought of in the literature as a poverty trap where there is a self-reinforcing mechanism in low levels of wealth. We use this nomenclature to differentiate between poverty due to individual/household characteristics (here we use skill—which we assume does not change) and poverty due to state dependence of a specific kind which we also refer to these as *hysteresis* poverty traps. This is not to suggest that any type of poverty is necessary.

However, the tests do not differentiate between the two types of processes that lead to persistent poverty. We highlight the importance of measured shocks (both positive and negative) in differentiating between the two types of poverty traps and propose a shocks-based threshold estimation approach that can differentiate between the two.

Distinguishing between these two types of poverty traps is vital for the design of poverty reduction programs. Individuals caught in an unnecessary deprivation poverty trap can be assisted by capital grants or even the development of financial institutions that can meet their credit and risk management needs (Balboni et al., 2022; Lybbert et al., 2004). In contrast, such programs would have no durable impact on those caught in conditional convergence poverty traps as can be seen in studies such as Blattman, Fiala and Martinez (2020). Addressing the poverty of this latter group requires regular income transfers, and/or waiting for general economic growth to raise wages and do what Ravallion (2016) calls the heavy lifting of poverty reduction.

In their impact evaluation of a capital grant program for ultra-poor women involved in casual wage labor occupations, Balboni et al. (2022) carefully show the existence of capital-based unnecessary deprivation poverty traps. In prior work, Bandiera et al. (2016) indicate that the grant would have no durable impacts if the women lacked the skills to succeed as entrepreneurs, or, in our language, if they were caught in conditional convergence poverty trap. Interestingly, their empirical results based on quantile treatment effects show that the program had no impact on about 40% of the population, whereas it had quite substantial and long-lasting effects for the other 60%. Their results thus appear to corroborate the theoretical insights we present in this paper and proposed previously by Buera (2009) regarding the coexistence of both conditional convergence and unnecessary deprivation poverty traps.

While well-designed impact evaluation of positive shocks can shed light on the coexistence of these two types of poverty traps and their relative preponderance, there has long been interest in using longitudinal and other observational data to gain a more general idea about the existence of poverty traps.<sup>3</sup> In this paper, we show that the approaches used in the literature can detect multiple-equilibria but cannot differentiate between conditional convergence or unnecessary deprivation poverty traps. Given that the meaning and policy implications of these two types of poverty traps are quite distinctive, we emphasize the importance of measured shocks and propose a method that can identify the presence of unnecessary deprivation and is robust to the coexistence of conditional convergence poverty traps.

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<sup>3</sup>Prominent examples include Ravallion and Lokshin (2002), Antman and McKenzie (2007), and Lybbert et al. (2004). Barrett and Carter (2013) provide a summary.

To do so, we use a dynamic stochastic model of occupational choice and asset accumulation to generate simulated data.<sup>4</sup> This approach allows us to control the underlying data generation process (DGP). Specifically, we modify the model such that the DGP allows only one of the types of poverty trap, both types of poverty traps, or no poverty trap at all. These distinct DGPs then allow us to explore the performance of different candidate poverty trap detection approaches. Using insights from the underlying theoretical model, we propose an empirical detection strategy that allows us to distinguish unnecessary deprivation traps from conditional convergence traps as long as realized shocks can be observed. Specifically, our proposed threshold estimator of excess shock sensitivity exploits the fact that shocks (positive or negative) have *persistent* effects on the well-being of individuals who are subject to unnecessary deprivation traps. In contrast, poor individuals caught in a conditional convergence trap will not exhibit this pattern as the impact of shocks will dissipate over time. We illustrate this approach using our simulated data and apply it to real data from [Balboni et al. \(2022\)](#) finding supportive evidence for the existence of unnecessary deprivation poverty traps.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a basic dynamic stochastic model of occupational choice and capital accumulation in the presence of heterogeneous endowments of entrepreneurial skill and initial (inherited) wealth. We illustrate the workings of the model and use it to generate the simulated panel data. The model also provides insights into the empirical strategy that we propose to use to distinguish conditional convergence from unnecessary deprivation poverty traps. Section 3 reviews the literature on the detection of poverty traps and illustrates the performance of the different approaches in the face of different data generation processes. Section 4 then presents our novel threshold approach of excess shock sensitivity and illustrates its operation in the face of the same data generation processes and ends with an illustration using real world data from [Balboni et al. \(2022\)](#). Section 5 provides a short discussion highlighting some caveats on measurement error and heterogeneity. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 A Dynamic Stochastic Model of Occupational Choice

While a number of models can generate poverty traps (see [Barrett and Carter \(2013\)](#), [Kraay and McKenzie \(2014\)](#), and [Ghatak \(2015\)](#) for recent reviews), we focus here on a parsimonious occupational choice model that is sufficiently general to allow the coexistence of conditional convergence and unnecessary deprivation poverty traps.<sup>5</sup> Because the goal

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<sup>4</sup>The model we employ is built on that of [Ikegami et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Janzen, Carter and Ikegami \(2021\)](#) and is similar to that found in [Buera \(2009\)](#).

<sup>5</sup>See Appendix C for a summary of the literature on micro-based poverty traps.

of our paper is primarily the empirical methods used to detect poverty traps, we are less interested in theory *per se* and more interested in having a known and manipulable data generation process that will allow us to test different approaches for detecting traps.

## 2.1 Coexistence of Two Types of Poverty Traps

We assume that individuals (hereafter agents) are born with a stock of wealth and an endowment of entrepreneurial skill. These resources can be used to generate income via a casual wage labor technology, which yields:

$$F_w = w_0 + f_w(k_{it})$$

where  $w_0$  is the return from participation in the casual labor market, and  $f_w$  gives the returns to wealth when invested, where we assume that  $f_w$  has positive and decreasing returns to scale. For discursive purposes, we assume that  $F_w$  is below the poverty line.

Alternatively, the agent can choose an entrepreneurial occupation which yields income:

$$F_e = [w_0 - F] + \alpha f_e(k_{it})$$

where  $F \leq w_0$  are the casual labor market earnings that are foregone when the agent pursues the entrepreneurial activity,  $\alpha$  is the agent's innate skill as an entrepreneur and  $f_e$ , which like  $f_w$  exhibits diminishing returns, but is more productive than  $f_w$  in the sense that  $f_e(k) > f_w(k) \forall k$ .

This model is similar to that of [Buera \(2009\)](#) although in his theoretical model an individual is required to give up their entire wage when committing any time to the entrepreneurial activity.

Note that under these occupation-specific earnings specification, agents with low wealth endowments will, in any given period, make more money under the casual labor occupation than as an entrepreneur. We define  $\hat{k}(\alpha)$  as the point where entrepreneurial activity becomes more remunerative in any given period to an agent with skill level  $\alpha$ . We assume that at any point in time, the agent will choose the most remunerative occupation, but can shift occupations costlessly. These assumptions imply that the agent's production set as the outer envelope of the two occupation specific income processes:

$$F(\alpha, k) = \max [F_w, F_e].$$

As with other models that lead to poverty traps, we assume imperfect markets with credit constraints where we rule out borrowing against future earnings, and so capital

can only be accumulated via foregone consumption. Thus, capital evolves following this equation of motion:

$$k_{it} = (k_{it-1} + F(\alpha_i, k_{it} - 1) - c_{t-1})(\theta_t - \delta)$$

where  $\delta$  is natural rate of depreciation and  $0 \leq \theta_t \leq 1$  is a random negative capital or depreciation shock. We assume that agents know the distribution of  $\theta_t$ .

To study the dynamics of occupational choice and poverty dynamics, we assume that agents solve the following inter-temporal maximization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{c_{jt}} \quad & E_{\theta} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_{jt}) \\ \text{subject to:} \quad & c_{jt} \leq k_{jt} + F(\alpha_j, k_{jt}) \\ & F(\alpha_j, k_{jt}) = \max [F_w, F_e] \\ & k_{jt+1} = (k_{jt} + f(k_{jt}) - c_{jt})(\theta_{jt+1} - \delta) \\ & k_{jt} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

where  $c_{jt}$  is an agent's consumption in time  $t$ .  $E_{\theta}$  is the expectation taken over the distribution of the negative shocks and  $\beta$  is the time discount factor.  $u(c_{it})$  is the utility function defined over consumption and satisfies Inada conditions.

This model is flexible: it allows for conditional convergence to a low equilibrium based on skill level. For those with an  $\alpha$  small enough, their long-run optimal strategy is to sort into the wage occupation even if in the short-run their capital level allows them to participate in entrepreneurial activities. For a middle skill group, there exists a level of capital  $\tilde{k}(\alpha)$  where an agent's optimal dynamic choice is to accumulate capital in order to access entrepreneurial activity. Finally, for the very skilled, it is always optimal to accumulate capital through saving to access entrepreneurship even if they start with or are shocked to a low level of capital and are participating in wage labor for the time being. While the model is based on occupational choice as discussed in [Buera \(2009\)](#) and [Balboni et al. \(2022\)](#), it is easily generalizable to choice between two agricultural technologies as seen in [Barrett and Carter \(2013\)](#) and [Ikegami et al. \(2019\)](#), for example.

## 2.2 Theoretical Implications and Insights for an Identification Strategy

We illustrate this flexible model and its theoretical implications through simulations. We numerically simulate this economy with random shocks with 101 different starting capital




FIGURE 1: Probability Poor After 40 Cycles: We show the probability from our simulations that agents adopt the wage labor in the long-run. Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows intermediate cycles illustrating the process over time.

(wealth) levels and 31 different ability levels. Using the maximization problem described above with heterogeneous ability and random starting positions, we simulate 60 cycles for every possible starting capital position and ability level for 1,001 different random negative shock profiles spanning the 60 cycles (life of the agent). We assume no positive shocks in our simulation. This creates 3,134,131 life cycles with 1,001 different different idiosyncratic and covariate shock sets for 3,131 ability and starting capital combinations.

In Figure 1, we show the probability that an agent in our simulation is poor after 40 cycles based on their ability (vertical axis) and starting capital (horizontal axis). This essentially shows the probability of an agent being in the low-level equilibrium earning a wage and not participating in entrepreneurial activities in the long-run. Initially, in time 0, our simulation has no correlation between ability and starting capital. After 40 cycles, those with higher ability are less likely to be at the low-equilibrium. In Figure A.1 in the Appendix, we show intermediate cycles illustrating the process over time.<sup>6</sup>

As is evident in Figure 1, it is possible to divide the domain of skill (ability level) into 3 types:

1. **Type A:** Agents with high skill positions who will always move toward non-poor standard of living by saving to access the entrepreneurial occupation irrespective of

<sup>6</sup>Figure A.2 shows a similar illustration where entry into entrepreneurship does not have a fixed cost and thus there is no poverty trap.

initial endowment of capital and shock history—specifically  $20 < \alpha$ .

2. *Type B*: Agents with intermediate skills levels whose long-term outcomes depends on their initial capital endowments and history of shocks—specifically  $5 < \alpha \leq 20$ .
3. *Type C*: Agents with low skill endowments who will always move toward the casual wage-labor occupation and a poor standard of living irrespective of initial capital endowment and shock history—specifically  $\alpha \leq 5$ .

Type A agents who start with large stocks of capital are automatically involved in the entrepreneurial activity and remain at the high equilibrium. Even if they face a series of shocks, their high skills mean they will recover to the high-equilibrium in the long-run. Among Type A agents who start with low amounts of capital, they are initially involved in wage labor but given their skill level, their dynamically optimal behavior is to save their way into entrepreneurial activity. Positive shocks would get the less capital endowed Type A agents to the high-equilibrium faster but they do not play a significant role in determining their equilibrium the long-run.

Type C agents are low skilled and no matter what their initial endowment of capital is, their optimal behavior is to sort into wage labor. Even if they start with high levels of capital, they consume their capital away to settle into wage labor and a low-level equilibrium. Thus, in our model, their skill level holds them in poverty. Negative or positive shocks will not have a long-term effect on Type C agents—they will end up at the same low-equilibrium, only they may reach the equilibrium more quickly or slowly if faced with different shocks.

Types A and C agents are, conditional on their skill, converging to a high- and low-level equilibria, respectively. Type B agents, on the other hand, can be unnecessarily deprived of the high-level equilibrium. Among type B agents, the model identifies a critical asset level  $\tilde{k}(\alpha_i)$  around which behavior bifurcates.<sup>7</sup> If an agent with skill  $\alpha_i$  is above this critical level of capital, they will decide to accumulate the capital they need to enter into entrepreneurial activities and reach a high-level equilibrium in the long-run. If at any point a negative shock places them below this threshold, their updated dynamically optimal behavior will be to de-accumulate and settle into wage labor at the low equilibrium. If they begin below this threshold, they will end up in wage labor (without a positive shock that puts them above the threshold). For example, a type B agent of ability level 11 faces a bifurcation threshold of 16. If their initial level is below, they remain in wage labor. If their initial capital is above 16, they will attempt to save their way into entrepreneurial activities, however,

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<sup>7</sup>This is different from  $\hat{k}(\alpha_i)$  which determines where the entrepreneurial activity becomes more remunerative than the casual wage labor in a given period.

with unfavorable shocks, they may end up below 16 at which point their dynamically optimal behavior is to de-accumulate their capital and settle in the low-equilibrium. For a group of Type B agents with middle levels of capital endowments, *shocks can have lasting impacts in the long-run*.

To further illustrate the unnecessary deprivation trap for Type B agents, in Figure A.3 in the Appendix, we again focus on agents whose ability level is 11. We plot average growth rates by baseline capital levels and clearly see a discontinuity at capital level 16. This figure shows the bifurcation threshold where individuals above capital level 16 will grow over time (on average) and those below will de-accumulate and reach the low level equilibrium.<sup>8</sup> Plotting average growth, however, gives us more information; we are able to see where the low- and high-level equilibria are—where our two discontinuous curves intersect the 0-growth horizontal line. For agents of ability level 11 who are facing a poverty trap, we can see that their low-level equilibrium is at 4 units of capital and their high level is 38. However, as we will show below, the methods used to detect traps cannot differentiate between data generating processes with unnecessary deprivation (Type B) only or conditional convergence (Type A and C) only.

Finally, we note that the studies in the literature often distinguish between single equilibrium poverty trap models, multiple equilibrium poverty trap models, and models without poverty traps. For example, Balboni et al. (2022) clearly outline conditional convergence models with a low and high equilibrium and a state-dependence poverty trap models (which we refer to a unnecessary deprivation poverty traps) to solidify the difference between the two. Our model here illustrates that they can coexist in a single economy with heterogeneously skill endowed agents subject to the same technology choices.

### 2.3 Simulating Alternative DGPs

By restricting the domain of skills that we allow to enter the model above, we can manipulate the data generating process to allow us to explore the robustness of different poverty trap detection methods. In particular, we will consider four distinct data generation processes depending on what types of equilibria they admit:

1. *DGP1—No Poverty Traps:*

By setting the fixed cost associated with the entrepreneurial technology to zero, we create a DGP in which all agents, irrespective of skill, will converge toward the non-

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<sup>8</sup>This plot reinforces the intuition in the method proposed by Arunachalam and Shenoy (2017) on poverty trap detection using probability of negative growth by baseline well-being levels which we will discuss in the next section.

poor entrepreneurial equilibrium. This process is illustrated in Figure A.2 in the Appendix.

2. *DGP2–Unnecessary Deprivation Traps Only*

By restricting the skill domain to include only Type B agents, we create a DGP where all agents are potentially subject to unnecessary deprivation poverty traps. To remove complexity, for this DGP, we restrict the skill level to 11 (See Figure 1).

3. *DGP3–Conditional Convergence Traps Only*

By excluding Type B agents, we are left with Type A and C agents and a resulting DGP with two groups converging to a low and a high-equilibrium but no unnecessary deprivation through hysteresis.

4. *DGP4–Coexisting Conditional Convergence and Unnecessary Deprivation Traps*

This DGP admits all three types of agents, meaning that a twin peak income distribution will be expected to emerge, and that the lower peak will be comprised of both low ability “conditional convergers” as well as unnecessarily deprived Type B.

To illustrate our approach and the limitations of other approaches, we will draw samples from these different data generating processes. In our main analysis, we will add a small amount of classical measurement error. In section 5, we discuss sensitivity to measurement error and other survey complexities.

An additional consideration that will influence the efficacy of different estimation methods is the degree to which initial assets and entrepreneurial skill are correlated. When these two endowments are weakly correlated, it will imply that there will be a lot of noise in the data in the sense that two individuals with the same initial capital endowments, but radically different skill levels may tend to accumulate in opposite directions, making it hard to detect patterns and even multiple equilibrium. At the other extreme, if initial capital and skill are perfectly correlated, then multiple equilibria become easy to detect and the fact that skill is latent is of no consequence.

Over time, the skill-capital correlation will tend to increase when individuals follow the optimization model shown above. However, in contrast to this theoretical model of infinitely lived agents, in the real world, generational change will tend to weaken that correlation as assets are divided amongst children and as skill shifts between generations. In an effort to capture the flavor of the real world that makes poverty trap detection difficult, we will assume an intermediate level of correlation (0.5) between initial assets and entrepreneurial skill. Section 5 returns to explore the robustness of the different approaches to higher and lower levels of skill-asset correlation.

### 3 Existing Empirical Methods to Detect Poverty Traps

A variety of empirical methods have been used in the literature to test for the presence of poverty traps. In line with the microeconomic focus of this paper, we will discuss here only methods used to test for traps at the individual or household levels. Likely due to the empirical difficulty in modeling the dynamics of individual and household well-being and the high levels of panel data requirements, there is a dearth of studies *directly* testing for poverty traps (Barrett, Garg and McBride, 2016).

Early work on poverty traps would test for bi-modal distributions of income or assets. While bi-modal distributions are not sufficient conditions for poverty traps, they are expected in settings with low heterogeneity. We expect, over time for individuals to either fall into a low equilibrium or climb to a high one based—at least partially—on their initial levels of well-being. In fact, implicit in the poverty trap models is instability in the middle near the bifurcation threshold and thus we do not expect to find a concentration of observations in the middle. Quah (1996) looks at the bivariate density of national output and its fifteen-year lag, taking density with two peaks as evidence of a poverty trap. In Balboni et al. (2022), the authors show bi-modal asset distributions as supportive evidence for the existence of poverty traps among very poor women in Bangladesh.

Other empirical methods have been used to directly estimate the dynamics of economic well-being essentially testing if the data shows S-shaped dynamics and to see if the non-linear relationship between current and past measures of well-being cross the 45 degree line more than once and specifically from below (see Antman and McKenzie (2007), Lybbert et al. (2004), and Balboni et al. (2022), for examples). Parametric, semi-parametric, and non-parametric methods have been used in the literature to estimate dynamics of well-being using measures such as income, consumption, or assets.

*Parametric Methods*—Studies mainly using parametric methods have estimated higher order polynomials of state-dependence (for example, current income on a higher-order polynomial of lagged income) using a variety of methods to control for heterogeneity and other forms of endogeneity. Some have used flow measures of well-being such income and/or expenditure (Lokshin and Ravallion, 2004; Jalan and Ravallion, 2002; Antman and McKenzie, 2007) while others used asset stocks (Barrett et al., 2006; Balboni et al., 2022). To control for individual fixed effects and avoid Nickel bias present in dynamic fixed effects models (Nickell, 1981), many authors use dynamic panel data methods (Arellano and Bond, 1991). This increases the data requirements of these panels as these methods use lagged values as instruments. Most of these studies using parametric methods on representative data find dynamics that are non-linear while the evidence on bifurcation

thresholds and multi-equilibrium poverty traps is mixed.

*Semi- and Non-parametric Methods*—Several studies have used non-parametric estimation to model well-being dynamics. [Lybbert et al. \(2004\)](#) apply this to show clear S-shaped dynamics in herd size among Ethiopian pastoralists. In South Africa, [Adato, Carter and May \(2006\)](#) analyze asset dynamics with local linear regressions, while [Barrett et al. \(2006\)](#) and [Kwak and Smith \(2013\)](#) also apply non-parametric methods to their data. [Balboni et al. \(2022\)](#) use local polynomial regressions to estimate the dynamics of assets using experimental data.<sup>9</sup> However, non-parametric methods are limited in the ability to control for other covariates. [Naschold \(2012\)](#) uses semi-parametric techniques to estimate asset dynamics to test for poverty traps in India and again in Pakistan and Ethiopia ([Naschold, 2013](#)). Similar to parametric methods, the evidence is mixed in its conclusions regarding the existence of multi-equilibrium poverty traps.

*Indirect Tests*—Other indirect tests of poverty traps are guided by the theoretical predictions of the models that suggest certain behaviors around the bifurcation thresholds. For example, one common prediction of a poverty trap model is that individuals around the threshold would take a hit to their consumption in the face of a shock in order to smooth (protect) their assets over time ([Barrett and Carter, 2013](#)). Studies such as those by [Carter and Lybbert \(2012\)](#) and [Hoddinott \(2006\)](#) clearly show such asset smoothing behavior. [Lybbert and McPeak \(2012\)](#) show that preferences regarding risk and discounting are consistent with multi-equilibrium poverty trap models. Another indirect test by [Santos and Barrett \(2011\)](#) shows that informal lending is highest among those near the bifurcation threshold where the returns are highest.<sup>10</sup>

Still more, [Carter et al. \(2007\)](#) use a large negative shocks of a hurricane and show differential growth rates based on asset levels as evidence of poverty traps. Similarly, [Arunachalam and Shenoy \(2017\)](#), henceforth A&S, use similar intuition regarding growth to set up a test for poverty traps. The intuition behind their method is that when a poverty trap exists, the probability of negative growth should increase near the threshold (from below) and decrease after it. Dynamics with convergence would show an ever increasing probability of negative growth while dynamics with poverty traps would show a drop in the middle of the distribution. A&S propose testing for poverty traps by calculating the probability of negative growth by baseline well-being deciles.

*Feedback Loops*—One last approach that specifically focuses on behavioral traps attempts

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<sup>9</sup>They authors use a variety of methods; they show bi-modal distributions, show parametric cubed specifications in their Appendix, and use non-parametric methods to show S-shaped dynamics and explicitly testing the relationship's convexity.

<sup>10</sup>Similarly, [Keswell and Carter \(2014\)](#) show, using positive shocks, that large future outcomes can be explained by transfers unlocking higher equilibria.

to estimate the feedback loop between economic and psychological well-being. If the average effects in either direction combined are large enough, this can lead to a downward (or upward if we assume symmetric effects) spiral. The results on psychological poverty traps are also mixed (Alloush, 2024; Haushofer, 2019).

A number of papers have found evidence suggesting the existence of traps. On the other hand, a large literature has failed to find strong evidence for poverty traps or conditions that might lead to traps. We posit (among others) that this does not necessarily mean that multi-equilibrium poverty traps do not exist. In Appendix D, we describe important real-world and data collection complexities that make multi-equilibrium poverty traps difficult to empirically detect. Moreover, in the next section, we show that finding evidence for traps does not necessarily mean that the traps are of the unnecessary deprivation type.

### 3.1 Existing Direct Methods Can Detect Poverty Traps, But What Kind?

We will focus on direct tests for poverty traps. We argue that these tests can detect multi-equilibria under some conditions, but cannot differentiate between unnecessary deprivation (the type of trap usually implied) and conditional convergence. We illustrate this by applying four approaches to samples from the different data generating processes in our simulation.

We use the universe of observations in our simulated dataset to represent a population with a data generating process with heterogeneity where conditional convergence and unnecessary deprivation traps co-exist. We have heterogeneity based on ability that leads to different types and differences in the long-run equilibrium. The other source of heterogeneity is random negative shock profiles over their life cycle.<sup>11</sup> This is significantly lower levels of heterogeneity than what we expect to find in real-world settings.

To emulate data collection through surveys, we randomly sample 5,000 agents into our panel. We will assume no attrition and relatively well-measured data. To take into account the possibility that we may observe agents in different parts of their life-cycle, we randomly generate a number between 1 and 20 for each agent which we designate as the first observation in their own life cycle.<sup>12</sup> We then keep data for 5 "waves" that are 2 cycles apart for each individual. A large panel dataset with and at least five waves is becoming more common—for example the Indonesia Family Life Survey, South Africa's NIDS, or India's ICRISAT.

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<sup>11</sup>There are two types of random shocks; idiosyncratic shocks of size 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, and 0.05 and covariate shocks that can be larger up to 0.6. Covariate shocks are zero approximately 80% of the time; the distribution of the overall shock when the covariate shock is non-zero can be found in Figure A.4.

<sup>12</sup>Since we start with a random allocation of capital for each ability level, the earlier we observe the agent, the less correlated their capital stock is with their ability.

We observe an agent’s capital level  $k_{it}$  and consumption  $c_{it}$  with small amounts of measurement error (correlation between observed and actual capital is 0.95).<sup>13</sup> In the previous section, we describe common methods used in the literature to test for poverty traps. Below, we apply the some of these approaches on our simulated data with known data generating processes. We start with the simplest case where we do not have any poverty trap (DGP1) and show the results for the other three cases where we have unnecessary deprivation only, conditional convergence only, and the mix of the two. We show that these common approaches can detect multiple equilibria under these conditions, but cannot differentiate between unnecessary deprivation traps and conditional convergence.

### 3.1.1 No Trap

In this section, we sample data from a population where there are no costs to entering entrepreneurial activities (DGP1) where all agents converge to a high-equilibrium and thus this data generating process has no poverty trap (See Figure A.2).

For our main results, we will use capital as our main variable of interest. We show four sets of results: first, we present density plots that look for bi-modal distributions. Second, we show results that estimate well-being dynamics using OLS and dynamic panel data methods that take into account agent fixed effects (Arellano and Bond, 1991). We then show non-parametric estimation of the dynamics (using local linear regressions),<sup>14</sup> and finally we show results using the method proposed by Arunachalam and Shenoy (2017). Details on each of these approaches can be found in Appendix E. For all of these methods, our baseline specifications use a lag of two which is essentially four cycles. In these studies, for comparison purposes, we restrict the analysis to the last observed wave; the econometric setup of Arellano and Bond (1991) requires the use of lags as instruments thus restricting the sample used in the method.<sup>15</sup>

Figure 2 clearly shows a data patterns that do not suggest the existence of traps or multiple equilibria. Here, the patterns show convergence to a high-level equilibrium. In Panel A, we do not see a bi-modal density; in Panels B and C, parametric and non-parametric approaches to estimate the dynamics of capital do not show patterns that suggest the existence of more than one equilibrium. The results are suggesting an average equilibrium at  $k = 40$ . Finally, using the A&S method looking at the probability of negative growth at dif-

<sup>13</sup>The results do not change without measurement error, however, as we show in Appendix, detection of multiple-equilibria is sensitive to measurement error.

<sup>14</sup>In this simulated economy, covariates are limited and thus we do not deem it necessary to use semi-parametric methods.

<sup>15</sup>The results of the other methods do not differ in a meaningful way if we use data from other available waves in the estimation.




FIGURE 2: DGP1–No Poverty Traps

ferent baseline deciles of well-being, we see an increasing likelihood of negative growth, a pattern we expect when there are no multiple equilibria.

### 3.1.2 Unnecessary Deprivation

Next we will look at a simple case where agents in our sample are of ability level 11 where they all face a trap with a bifurcation threshold capital level that is the same ( $\tilde{k}(11) = 16$ ). This is a state-dependence case that typifies poverty traps in the literature. Agents can end up at the high-equilibrium if they start with a high level of capital and do not face a shock history that ever places them below the threshold. None of the agents here will necessarily end up at the low equilibrium if they had started at a capital level above the threshold. Their skill level is such that their long-run status in terms of entrepreneurship is based on their starting level of capital and their shock history—not their ability. As opposed to Type C (low ability) agents, those who are poor here are unnecessarily deprived.

The results for detecting povrty traps in this simple case with unnecessary deprivation traps are shown in Figure 3. We can see from the four panels of the figure that each of the methods suggests the existence of a poverty trap. The density-based approach in Panel A suggest two groupings of capital at the low- and high-level equilibria and a low density around the threshold where we would expect instability given the theoretical model




FIGURE 3: DGP2—Unnecessary Deprivation Traps Only: For a group with ability level of 11, all facing the same bifurcation threshold, all methods support the existence of poverty traps.

the simulation is built on. Parametric methods estimating a higher order polynomial regression in Panel B show S-shaped dynamics that cross the 45 degree line from below and above suggesting a multi-equilibrium poverty trap with low and high equilibria at around 5 and 39, respectively. In Panel C, we present the results of non-parametric local linear regressions which show non-convex dynamics of capital that intersect the 45 degree line from below. This approach correctly suggest levels for the low and high equilibria but also exhibits a very steep curve at baseline capital levels 15-17 suggesting a bifurcation threshold around that level.

Finally in Panel D, using the A&S method estimating the probability of negative asset growth based on initial capital deciles, we see an increase in the probability of negative growth and a then a clear drop at the 4th decile—strongly suggesting the existence of a threshold where agents below this threshold are de-accumulating assets and those above are accumulating to enter the entrepreneurial activity. It is not straightforward to map the low- and high-level equilibria or the bifurcation threshold when using this approach. However, the method is intuitive, simple to implement, and can potentially be applied in very general settings.

### 3.1.3 Conditional Convergence

In this section, we take away agents facing unnecessary deprivation traps (Type B) and leave in two very different groups; low ability (Type C) bound for the low return wage occupation and a low level equilibrium, and high ability (Type A) bound for the high equilibrium.<sup>16</sup> In this data generating process, there is no unnecessary deprivation poverty traps. For our agents, conditional on their ability level, they are either converging to the low equilibrium or the high one. Their shock history and initial capital endowments do not matter in determining whether they participate in entrepreneurial activities and reach the high-level equilibrium in the long-run.

Figure 4 shows the same tests used to test for poverty traps for a sample from this DGP with a conditional convergence poverty trap—two groups with unobserved characteristics correlated with the baseline level of capital that determine which occupation they sort into in the long run. Despite the different DGP, the pattern observed is similar to what we observe in Figure 3. When we draw a sample from a population with two groups sorting into different occupations based on unobserved characteristics, we cannot differentiate, using these methods, between this process of occupational sorting and unnecessary deprivation poverty traps where an individual can end up either at the high or low equilibrium based on their initial endowment of capital (and the shocks they face).

The similarity in the observed patterns is noteworthy as studies that use these approaches are usually testing for unnecessary deprivation traps by looking for specific type of state dependence (Balboni et al., 2022; Barrett, Garg and McBride, 2016). Both DGPs have individuals who are falling to the low level equilibrium and others who are accumulating to reach the high level equilibrium. Without being able to differentiate the latent groups in the DGP3 (conditional convergence), the threshold where individuals switch between entrepreneurship and wage labor may lead to estimated dynamics that look S-shaped.

An important point when considering this data generating process is the starting correlation between observed capital and ability.<sup>17</sup> In this case, we choose to the starting cycle in our data to be cycle number 8 when correlation between ability and capital is approximately 0.5. Higher levels of initial correlation make the figures more starkly resemble those of the DGP2. On the other hand, when there is no (or less) correlation (when capital

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<sup>16</sup>For simplicity, we take extreme values here and leave only those with ability 1 and 30. In the baseline period, the correlation between ability and capital is approximately 0.5. In this conditional convergence setup, this occurs at cycle 8. In the start of our simulation, there is no correlation between starting ability and starting capital. By cycle 8, the correlation is reaches 0.5. We discuss and show how these results differ by this initial baseline correlation levels in Section 5.

<sup>17</sup>For simplicity, in DGP2 we had only 1 ability level, so there is no correlation.




FIGURE 4: DGP3—Conditional Convergence Traps Only: Applying these methods to a data generating process with no unnecessary deprivation (poverty traps) but two groups conditionally converging to different equilibria shows similar patterns.

is randomly assigned or closer to it) lead to figures that do not resemble those created with unnecessary deprivation traps. Figure A.5 in the Appendix shows the results for when correlation at the start of the panel is low.

### 3.1.4 Heterogeneity

Realistically, when are studying representative samples, we will likely have significant heterogeneity. It may well be that conditional convergence and unnecessary deprivation co-exist in the population. In Figure 5, we show the results of these tests when we draw our sample from the population of full ability levels of our simulation. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the patterns we observe in Figures 3 and 4, when both types of processes co-exist, the patterns look quite similar suggesting a multi-equilibrium process.

However, not all forms of heterogeneity lead to the same patterns. If the heterogeneity is one-sided—that is, if we only have Type B and Type A or Type B and Type C—these tests may no longer suggest multiple-equilibria in the first place. At any given point, the number of agents around the threshold is small making it statistically difficult to see these patterns especially when we have measurement error.




FIGURE 5: DGP4—Coexistence of conditional convergence and unnecessary deprivation poverty traps: Full ability spectrum with mix of unnecessary deprivation and conditional convergence traps.

To sum, in this section we show, using simulated data, that existing methods to test for poverty traps cannot differentiate between sorting into different occupations (wage vs entrepreneurial activity) based on unobserved agent characteristics (conditional convergence traps) and a process where there is unnecessary deprivation whereby agents end up in different occupations based on their initial endowment of capital and their shock histories.

## 4 A Novel Threshold-based Approach

We propose a threshold-based poverty trap approach that both detects traps (when they exist), but also allows us to identify whether or not unnecessary deprivation traps exist. We first argue that without well-measured shocks, we cannot differentiate between the conditional convergence and unnecessary deprivation.

Intuitively, it should not be surprising that the two processes lead to similar patterns in the data. In the extreme case where there is no shuffling (every one is born at a high or low

equilibrium—the appropriate one given an agent’s ability under conditional convergence) and there are no shocks, in the long run we will observe two concentrations of capital (and income) at the low and high equilibria for both DGPs. However, this does not tell us how the agents arrived at each equilibrium. If we were able to observe skill, in the conditional convergence case, we will have very high rates of correlation between skill and capital while in the unnecessary deprivation case we will have none (if all agents have the same skill level) or low correlation (if we have a wider range of ability yet all still potentially facing unnecessary deprivation, for example ability levels 10-15 in Figure 1.).

In the other extreme where initial capital is completely random (as in the start of our simulation), this will allow us to differentiate between DGP2 (unnecessary deprivation only) and DGP3 (conditional convergence only). However, real-world panel survey data does not start with completely random allocations of capital or other measure of economic well-being.

In order to differentiate between the two, we require something that is not a natural part of the data generating process. Shocks, especially well-measured shocks, give exogenous variation that allows us to differentiate between unnecessary deprivation and conditional convergence. Intuitively, shocks add some degree of *shuffling* into the economy that create conditions closer to random allocation than an economy without shocks.

To solidify ideas, consider the simplest case where all agents face potential unnecessary deprivation (Type B). At any given point, we have three groups within Type B:

1. **Group 1:** Agents who are below their threshold  $\tilde{k}(\alpha)$  and are at or converging to the low-level equilibrium.
2. **Group 2:** This group of agents are right above their threshold capital level; for the time being their optimal behavior is to save and accumulate capital and participate in entrepreneurial activities. However, they are vulnerable and shocks may be large enough to push them below their threshold after which their optimal path is to de-accumulate capital and stay in wage labor.
3. **Group 3:** This group of moderately skilled agents are far above their threshold (either because of their initial endowment or accumulation with favorable shock profiles) and are relatively safe at the high-equilibrium unless a series of large shocks brings them below—which is possible but unlikely.

Under the assumption of no massive positive or negative shocks, Groups 1 and 3, despite being Type B, are converging towards the low and high equilibria, respectively. In our simulation, the impact of shocks among these groups in the long run should not be large and will decay over time.

In Group 2 on the other hand, shocks can have large *lasting* impacts. To solidify ideas, assume that we group agents by their capital levels in time  $t$ . In time  $t + 5$ , without significant shocks in between  $t$  and  $t + 5$ , the agent may have accumulated their way to be in Group 3, or if they did experience shocks, they may be de-accumulating to become part of Group 1. Among those in Group 2, a shock in time  $t + 1$  or  $t + 2$  may have important impacts because it might push the agent below their bifurcation threshold. Thus, shocks in later periods will likely have smaller effects on capital, income, or poverty status in the future relative to shocks closer to the period in which the grouping was defined.

Now consider a case where all agents face conditional convergence (DGP3 with Type A and C only). Here, we do not have bifurcation thresholds (though there are levels of capital where agents switch from wage labor to entrepreneurship) and we just have two types: Type A agents who are either at the high-equilibrium and set or they are below and are saving to accumulate enough assets to become entrepreneurs and eventually settle at the high equilibrium. We also have Type C agents who are either at the low equilibrium, or if they happen to start with capital (an endowment from their family for example) are slowly de-accumulating their capital until they settle at the low equilibrium.

Shocks among agents following this data generating process do not have irreversible effects as they do among the Type B-Group 2 agents. These agents are conditionally converging and the effect of shocks will decay over time. Without shocks, it is difficult to distinguish between these two different processes by estimating their dynamics. Below, we outline a threshold-based approach that uses shocks to distinguish between conditional convergence and unnecessary deprivation.

#### 4.1 A Threshold-based Poverty Trap Test

To illustrate our approach under ideal data conditions, we assume we have panel data with two income observations  $k$  cycles apart with data on exogenous shocks in each cycle between the two observations. In the scenario where we observe an individual in time  $t$  and after  $k$  cycles where we have information on the shocks in each cycle, we can estimate the following equation on the dynamics of capital and the lasting effect of shocks on it:

$$\ln(y_{i,t}) = \alpha + \beta \ln(y_{i,t-k}) + \sum_{j=1}^k \delta_j \theta_{i,t-j} + e_{i,t}$$

where  $y_{i,t}$  is a measure of capital in time  $t$  and  $\theta_{i,t-k}$  is a measure of shocks (in percent)  $k$  cycles ago. Estimating this equation for all in our sample would average out the dynamics and the effect of shocks. Under convergence (conditional or otherwise), the effect of shocks

would dissipate over time and thus the estimated coefficients would should decay— $\delta_5$ , the coefficient on  $\theta_{i,t-5}$  (measure of the shock 5 cycles ago) would be less than  $\delta_4$  and less than  $\delta_3$  and so on. More recent shocks play a bigger role in determining current income.

However, if unnecessary deprivation exists, then there is a set of agents (Type B-Group 2) who are especially sensitive to shocks; for them shocks can have irreversible consequences. In the case where all agents face potential unnecessary deprivation (all Type B), then the only variable identifying groups 1, 2, and 3 is the baseline level of capital. For baseline capital levels just above the threshold, there is high sensitivity to the size of the shock they face in the cycles right after the baseline when these groups are defined.

Given that we generally do not know what the threshold is, we can use a threshold estimation approach (Hansen, 2000) to split the sample by baseline capital and estimate the above equation for each group separately. For simplicity of illustration, we do this for two thresholds and thus three groupings.<sup>18</sup> The equation can be represented as such:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(y_{it}) = & (\alpha_1 + \beta_1 \ln(y_{i,t-k}) + \sum_{j=1}^k \delta_{1,j} \theta_{i,t-k}) \mathbb{1}_{(-\infty < y_{t-k} < \gamma_1)} \\ & + (\alpha_2 + \beta_2 \ln(y_{i,t-k}) + \sum_{j=1}^k \delta_{2,j} \theta_{i,t-k}) \mathbb{1}_{(\gamma_1 < y_{t-k} < \gamma_2)} \\ & + (\alpha_3 + \beta_3 \ln(y_{i,t-k}) + \sum_{j=1}^k \delta_{3,j} \theta_{i,t-k}) \mathbb{1}_{(\gamma_2 < y_{t-k} < \infty)} + e_{it} \end{aligned}$$

where  $\gamma_1$  and  $\gamma_2$  represent the possible threshold levels of capital. This approach minimizes least squares allowing for the possibility of three different regimes. In our simple case where all are facing potential unnecessary deprivation, the early  $\delta$ s will be large among those right above the bifurcation threshold and statistically different from the coefficients in the other two regimes that are conditionally converging to the low and high equilibria. Under this regime, we expect the measured effect of shocks to decrease among those in the middle group as they accumulate or de-accumulate their way either to group 1 or 2.

The reliability of this approach depends on having measured shocks as close to the baseline time period as possible. For example, with positive shocks (such as an income or capital transfer), having a baseline right before shock is ideal. If we measure the shocks too late, those in group 2 (defined by the baseline levels of capital) will likely fall into the two other groups (1 and 3) and shocks in later cycles are unlikely to show large effects.

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<sup>18</sup>In practice, we allow for a maximum of 4 thresholds to be determined by the data and thus 5 regions. We allow the data to determine if the coefficients in the regions are statistically different enough to warrant different grouping.

## 4.2 Using shocks to Identify Unnecessary Deprivation

We use this approach with a series of different data structures. First, we will we illustrate the method with a data intensive example. We will then discuss how this approach can be used when we only observe one shock and its efficacy based on how far the shock is from the baseline data collection. Finally, we will show how shocks can be used in an experimental setting to identify multiple equilibria and differentiate between conditional convergence and unnecessary deprivation traps.

### 4.2.1 Many shocks: Decay vs Lasting Effects

In this section, we apply the method to our four data generating processes assuming a wealth of well-measured data on shocks in between the two periods. For illustrative purposes, we use two measures of capital 6 cycles apart with shocks sizes recorded between waves.


Figure 6 shows this method applied to the four different data-generating processes. Allowing for a data-driven selection of the optimal number of thresholds leads to an indirect first-stage test. When there are identifiable unnecessary deprivation traps, there should be three different regimes based on the baseline capital levels. Assuming enough of a density in the middle and large enough shocks, the effect of shocks right after the baseline should necessarily be large if there is a group facing a bifurcation threshold.

Under DGP1 where no traps exist, the approach suggests two regions, however the effect of shocks is very similar across the two regimes. The shocks show a decaying trend as would be expected under convergence. More recent shocks have a much bigger effect on current levels of capital than older shocks.


Under DGP2 where we have unnecessary deprivation poverty traps, the method splits the sample into three groupings based on baseline capital. It identifies a vulnerable group starting around the correct bifurcation threshold. In Figure 6(B), this group is represented by region 2 where early shocks (those just after the baseline measurement of capital) have an outsized effect on capital several cycles into the future. Among this group, the estimated effect of shocks (in time  $t - k$ ) on capital in time  $t$  becomes smaller as  $k$  becomes smaller because most of members of this group identified through capital levels at  $t - 6$  has either gone down or up (group 1 or 3) and has begun to converge to a low or high equilibrium. The key is to observe the shock close to the time of the baseline.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Regressing growth on lagged capital and shocks for each region allows us to determine the equilibrium capital levels by using the coefficients and solving for zero growth—or plotting growth on capital for the three regions as we show in Appendix Figure A.6. For region two, when accounting for shocks, this approach correctly shows that this group is never in equilibrium and is growing.




(A) DGP1–No Traps



(B) DGP2–Unnecessary Deprivation only



(C) DGP3–Conditional Convergence Only



(D) DGP4–Mix

FIGURE 6: We apply this shocks-based approach to the four different DGPs. For DGP2, the shocks-based threshold estimation approach identifies 3 groups when there is unnecessary deprivation. The middle group shows high sensitivity to shocks early on. This follows the intuition of unnecessary deprivation traps.

Under DGP3 where agents face conditional convergence, the method identifies only two regions where there is decay, although it is not as severe as under DGP1. In our data the correlation between baseline capital and skill is approximately 0.5 at the baseline and thus there is still a certain amount of shuffling. There are still high skill agents accumulating capital and low skill agents de-accumulating slowly. Shocks likely play a role slowing down accumulation or speeding up de-accumulation. With higher levels of correlation between baseline skill and asset levels, the decay in the effect of shocks would be steeper than what is observed in Figure 6(C).

Finally, under DGP4 where there is co-existence of conditional convergence and unnecessary traps, the method finds three regions. It is important to note that those in region 2

(middle group) now are a mix of Type B group 2 agents, Type A agents accumulating capital, and Type C agents de-accumulating capital. Type A and C agents are not as sensitive to shocks and thus add noise to this approach. Yet the data suggests three regions based on sensitivity to shocks and identifies the existence of unnecessary deprivation.

#### 4.2.2 One Shock

It is necessary for this approach to differentiate between conditional convergence and unnecessary deprivation that we observe shocks close to the baseline—the time period when we observe assets or income and split the sample using the threshold regression approach. We split the sample based on this data and the information we get from estimating the impact of the shock becomes less relevant when the measured shock is not close enough in time to the baseline. In the illustration above, we use simulations where the probability of large shocks is not very high (see Appendix Figure A.4 for the distribution of negative shocks). From Figure 6, we can infer that if we have information on only one shock, the closer it is to the baseline, the more likely it is we reject the equality of the coefficients on the shock and finding three regions where the coefficients on shocks are statistically different.

This approach could be used when a shock occurs soon after the baseline. Examples of this are negative shocks through natural disasters (for example Carter et al. (2007)) or positive shocks in randomized controlled trials (for example Balboni et al. (2022)). One strength of using randomized trials is that it is more likely individuals are shuffled to the relevant region where unnecessary deprivation can be detected. Without wide-spread shocks in our sample, it maybe that we do not have enough agents in the relevant middle regions who exhibit shocks that allows us to detect unnecessary deprivation by looking at excess sensitivity to these shocks.

Below, we simulate a random positive shock (with an asset transfer program in mind) to show that RCTs do not imply that existing approaches are able to differentiate between conditional convergence and unnecessary deprivation. We show that our proposed threshold regression method using the positive shock does differentiate between the two.

*Randomized Positive Shock*—We simulate a randomized asset transfer among all our of agents. Our transfer size is large; 10 units of capital which is 200% the low level equilibrium asset level. Since the bifurcation threshold capital level is approximately 15, our intention in this simulated experiment is to have a significant portion of those facing unnecessary deprivation traps to pass their threshold after the transfer. In this simulated experiment, we remove all other large shocks.

We first show that despite having a significant amount of shuffling, using approaches




FIGURE 7: After an experimental shock, using methods that estimated S-shaped dynamics show similar results for both data generating processes.

based on S-shaped dynamics still does not differentiate between conditional convergence and unnecessary deprivation. Figure 7(A) shows non-parametric regression results of regressing current capital  $k_t$  on capital just after the shock ( $k_{t-5}$ ) a data generating process that includes only unnecessary deprivation. Careful work such as that of [Balboni et al. \(2022\)](#) that uses positive shocks still use S-shaped dynamics as one of the methods to show existence of poverty traps. In their paper, they are explicitly testing for unnecessary deprivation traps. However, it is not clear that the methods can differentiate conditional convergence that they motivate their work with. As we can see in Figure 7(B) when we the data generating process contains conditional convergence only, non-parametric regression results show a very similar S-shaped curve.<sup>20</sup>

Shocks such as randomized treatments are important in properly identifying poverty traps. However, showing S-shaped dynamics is not sufficient in identifying unnecessary deprivation. Conditional sorting can show similar dynamics even after a shock. We show in Table 1 that applying our proposed method differentiates between unnecessary deprivation and conditional convergence through the sensitivity of a middle group to shocks. Under DGP2 where we have unnecessary deprivation, we can see in the left half of the table that our threshold-based approach identifies three regions: the middle region shows excess sensitivity to being treated (given the asset transfer). This coefficient is larger and statistically different from the coefficient on the treatment in the first region (low asset levels right before the positive shock) and the third region (high asset levels right before the

<sup>20</sup>In their paper, the authors restrict their sample to poor individuals, doing so here does not change the observed similarity in asset dynamics under conditional convergence and unnecessary deprivation.

TABLE 1: Threshold-Based Approach

	Unnecessary Deprivation		Conditional Convergence
Treated $\times \mathbb{1}_{(-\infty < y_{t-k} < 10.6)}$	0.480 (0.038)	Treated $\times \mathbb{1}_{(-\infty < y_{t-k} < 7)}$	0.808 (0.028)
Treated $\times \mathbb{1}_{(10.6 \leq y_{t-k} < 19)}$	0.816 (0.047)	Treated $\times \mathbb{1}_{(7 < y_{t-k} < 14)}$	0.776 (0.052)
Treated $\times \mathbb{1}_{(19 \leq y_{t-k} < \infty)}$	0.192 (0.006)	Treated $\times \mathbb{1}_{(14 \leq y_{t-k})}$	0.304 (0.017)

positive shock).

In the right hand side of Table 1, we show the results applying the method to DGP3 where agents are sorting into low wage work and entrepreneurial activity conditional on their ability. In this case, we still observe three regions, however, we do not see a middle region that exhibits excess sensitivity to the shock compared to the other two regions four cycles after the shock. The effect of the positive shock decreases with the initial asset level of the agent.

### 4.2.3 Applying the Method to Real Data

Finally, we apply our approach to data from recent work on poverty traps in Bangladesh (Balboni et al., 2022). This work carefully uses a randomized positive asset shock to show that growth for those who were above the threshold after the asset transfer was higher than those who received the asset transfer but were not above the bifurcation threshold. Throughout the analysis, the authors use some of the methods highlighted above to suggest unnecessary deprivation traps—although they are clear that these methods are not sufficient conditions for these types of traps.

We use the full sample of women and the randomized treatment variable. We apply our threshold regression specification on the difference in log of assets in the second follow up (3 or 4 years after the transfer—the same follow up the authors use in their study) on the log of original assets in the baseline before the transfer—a simplified one-shock version of our proposed estimation equation in section 4.1 and similar to the one-shock example in the previous section 4.2.2.

The results are shown in Table 2. On average, those with low levels of starting capital are clearly better off in the follow when they do receive the treatment by about 18%.

TABLE 2: Threshold-Based Approach

Treated $\times \mathbb{1}_{(-\infty < y_{t-k} < 3.01)}$	0.176 (0.043)
Treated $\times \mathbb{1}_{(3.01 \leq y_{t-k} < 11.1)}$	0.463 (0.103)
Treated $\times \mathbb{1}_{(11.1 \leq y_{t-k} < \infty)}$	0.137 (0.053)

However, as we would expect in the presence of—at least some—unnecessary deprivation poverty traps, we clearly find a spike in the middle group in terms of the effect of the treatment where those with middle starting levels of capital have a higher sensitivity to the treatment. Finally, in the last group with higher levels of starting capital, we find that the average effect of treatment is lower.

Our proposed approach provides supporting evidence that at least some of the women in the sample are facing unnecessary deprivation traps.

## 5 Robustness & Caveats

In the previous sections we showed the existing methods do not differentiate between conditional convergence and unnecessary deprivation traps. We propose a shocks-based threshold estimation approach that uses sensitivity to shocks to detect unnecessary deprivation. In this section, we discuss the sensitivity of our approach to common survey complexities.

**Measurement Error**—Measurement error in data is an issue we expect in individual and household-level surveys, especially among the poor. In rare cases, asset measurement may be a straightforward—for example counting cattle. In most cases, assets and other measures of well-being are difficult to accurately measure and may be misreported.

Existing methods fail to detect multiple equilibria with increasing measurement error (see Figure A.7). Our threshold-based estimator also fails when we have more measurement error in capital. This is not surprising since our sample splitting is based on the measure of capital in the baseline. In section 4, our proposed estimator relies on well-measured shocks. However, our method is robust to measurement error in the shocks.

**Correlation Between Baseline Well-being and Skill**—When there is less correlation between baseline well-being and unobserved skill, the common tests for traps will not show

a pattern that is usually attributed to unnecessary deprivation traps. To illustrate this, we show these results in Appendix Figure A.8 where we draw our sample from early in the life cycle where the correlation between skill and baseline level of capital is 0.2 instead of 0.5.

We can see in the figure that when we have DGP3 where agents are sorting into low and high equilibria conditional on their skill level and there are low levels of correlation between baseline well-being and skill (close to random starting levels of assets), the results from existing approaches can differentiate between conditional convergence and poverty traps.<sup>21</sup>

*Other Measures Of Well-being*—Finally, we provide a word of caution on using fluid measures of well-being such as consumption. In some studies, authors use other measures of well-being found in surveys. Capital or assets are often complicated to measure; some wealth-based indices have been used but as [Michelson, Muiz and DeRosa \(2013\)](#) show, arbitrary choices in constructing these indices can matter. Often it is easier to use a value of consumption or household income and to study the dynamics of these different measures that are already in an easy-to-interpret currency value.

We briefly give a word of caution on using consumption: we argue that consumption is a bad measure to use when thinking about modeling the dynamics of well-being for a variety of reasons. Most importantly, following most theoretical models of poverty traps, agents may experience high levels of consumption while de-accumulating assets to reach their long-term equilibrium at the low end. In fact we can see this in our data if we focus on two agents with the same ability and asset level who experience different sized shocks; one is just under the threshold post-shock and the other is just above. Comparing the consumption pattern of these two for a few periods after the shock shows that the agent bound for the low-equilibrium exhibits higher levels of consumption for a few cycles while the agent is taking a hit to consumption in order to invest and re-accumulate their capital. This follows the prediction of theoretical models regarding asset smoothing and have been shown to be evident in real-world data ([Carter and Lybbert, 2012](#)).

Figure A.9 in the Appendix shows the results of the four tests of poverty traps when we used perfectly measured consumption where all agents face an unnecessary deprivation poverty trap (DGP2). The dynamics here are more complicated and even with perfect measurement, the figures do not unequivocally suggest multiple equilibria as do the results in Figure 3. Our proposed method also suffers from this limitation because are sample splitting relies on the baseline measure of well-being.

Clearly showing how detection of multiple-equilibria is sensitive to common survey

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<sup>21</sup>We do not replicate these for DGP2 because we only have 1 skill level.

complexities such as the ones we discuss here and in Appendix D is a fruitful avenue for future research.

## 6 Conclusions

We show that common approaches testing for poverty traps cannot differentiate between conditional convergence traps (sorting) and unnecessary deprivation (hysteresis)—despite most claiming to test for the latter where households are poor because of low starting capital endowments. The policy solutions to these two types of persistent poverty are different. We argue the importance of random shuffling (through shocks) and propose a threshold-based approach that uses shocks to differentiate between the two forms of traps.

We use simulated data from a flexible model of asset accumulation that can produce no traps, unnecessary deprivation traps, conditional convergence traps, or both to clearly show that existing methods do not work and to illustrate our proposed shocks-based threshold estimation approach that points to the existence of unnecessary deprivation without confounding it with conditional convergence. We also apply our proposed approach to real world data finding support for the existence of unnecessary deprivation in the sample of women studied by [Balboni et al. \(2022\)](#).

Our results should caution researchers working on detecting poverty traps. Even in simple cases such as in our simulation, there is significant complexity in empirical patterns related to poverty traps and unnecessary deprivation. Careful use of shocks is necessary to accurately show if unnecessary deprivation is present.

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# Appendix

## Figures




FIGURE A.1: Simulations of this process show that both ability and starting positions play a role in determining poverty (measured with capital  $k$ ). Those both poor and with low abilities are trapped. Those with high abilities will eventually escape poverty no matter what their starting position is.




FIGURE A.2: Simulations of a version of this process without a poverty trap show that neither ability and starting positions play a role in determining poverty in the long-run.




FIGURE A.3: Ability Level 11: Facing a clear trap clearly showing divergent behavior when focusing on growth.




FIGURE A.4: Histogram showing shocks. 80% of cycles do not have any covariate shocks. This figure shows the distribution of the other 20%.




FIGURE A.5: DGP3–Conditional Convergence Traps Only: Applying these methods to a data generating process with no unnecessary deprivation (poverty traps) but two groups conditionally converging to different equilibria shows similar patterns.




FIGURE A.6: Growth regressions allow us to estimate the equilibrium capital levels.




FIGURE A.7: Measurement error and heterogeneity (DGP4) make it more difficult to detect multi-equilibria.




FIGURE A.8: DGP3—With less correlation between skill and baseline capital levels (0.2 instead of 0.5), we do not get results similar to that of unnecessary deprivation with common approaches.




FIGURE A.9: Using perfectly measured consumption where all are facing a trap (ability 11) shows mixed results.

## Appendix C

### The Theory of Micro-based Poverty Traps

There are several thorough review papers summarizing the literature on poverty traps at the macro and micro-levels. Recent work include [Barrett, Garg and McBride \(2016\)](#), [Kraay and Mckenzie \(2014\)](#), and [Barrett and Carter \(2013\)](#). It is not our aim to provide yet another review of the literature, but here we briefly discuss the theoretical underpinnings of microeconomic poverty traps.

Poverty traps are self-reinforcing mechanisms that cause poverty to persist ([Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005](#); [Barrett and Carter, 2013](#)). Poverty traps can be viewed as dynamic process with a specific type of state-dependence where a unit (be an individual, a household, a firm, a village, a region, or a country) is stuck in a low-level equilibrium and unable to escape to the existing higher-level equilibrium because they are poor to begin with. This can arise when there is a specific non-linear relationship between current well-being and future well-being. This is different from theories of convergence or conditional convergence illustrated in Panel A of Figure A.10. Under conditional convergence, initial well-being levels do not matter in determining which equilibrium level one ends up at in the long run. There could be many different equilibria, some low, and those who end up at the low equilibrium are there due to some characteristics or circumstance—not their baseline level of well-being or capital.

Poverty traps can theoretically arise in the presence of a mix of market failures and non-linearities. The main market failure that describes many poor settings are the non-existence of credit markets or the exclusion of the poor from credit markets (for example because of an inability to provide collateral). On the other hand, non-linearities have been suggested in many different domains. For example, theoretical models by [Dasgupta and Ray \(1986\)](#) suggest that if the link between labor productivity and food intake is non-linear (with an increasing return early on at very low levels of consumption), then this could trap individuals in low nutrient intake, low/no productivity equilibrium. This is closely related to the efficiency wage hypothesis ([Dasgupta, 1997](#); [Stiglitz, 1976](#)).<sup>22</sup>

From a production point of view, non-convex production processes could theoretically lead to poverty traps. An S-shaped production process with an increasing early returns to scale with respect to capital could trap those who start with low levels of capital in poverty. This is illustrated in Panel B of Figure A.10 with the black S-shaped curve where there are two stable equilibria at point A (low) and point B (high) and where one ends up depends

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<sup>22</sup>As [Kraay and Mckenzie \(2014\)](#) summarize, this seems unlikely to be resulting in poverty first because calories are fairly cheap around the world ([Subramanian and Deaton, 1996](#)). And second, even if healthy micronutrients should be differentiated from simple calorie intake, studies do not suggest that the relationship between either calorie or micronutrient intake and productivity is nonlinear ([Strauss and Thomas, 1998](#)).




FIGURE A.10: A Trap could be caused either by S-shaped dynamics or two different technologies with a fixed cost.

on their previous level of well-being,  $Y_{t-1}$ . More realistically, lumpy investments (in education or physical capital) create a large fixed cost that, in the absence of credit markets, could create a poverty trap (Loury, 1981; Galor and Zeira, 1993). This scenario is also illustrated in Panel B of Figure A.10 with the red curves showing two different technologies. This is the main theoretical model suggested when considering poverty traps. The higher-level technology requires a lumpy investment; in theory, one should be able to borrow but in many settings this type of credit is either unavailable or the poorest of the poor may be unable to access the credit needed to make lumpy investments. This can be generalized to getting a higher level of education to access higher paying jobs or being stuck in minimum wage paying jobs.<sup>23</sup>

In the last 10 years, more work has focused on self-reinforcing behavioral mechanisms that could potentially trap people in poverty. Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) develop a theoretical model where individuals spend on temptation and nontemptation goods where the share of income spent on temptation good declines with income; this results in the poor staying poor. Other work suggests that self-control is lower among the poor due to limited mental bandwidth (Shah, Mullainathan and Shafir, 2012) lower cognitive function Mani et al. (2013). Both of these could hinder the poor from being productive enough to escape poverty and are caused and reinforced by poverty themselves. These could theoretically create traps if the feedback loop is strong enough or there are strong non-convexities in at least one of the relationships.

<sup>23</sup>A group of studies specifically test for non-convexities in returns to investment in micro-enterprises in Mexico and Sri Lanka (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2006; De Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff, 2013); their work and that of others do not seem to suggest non-convexity in returns to investment and suggests that people can accumulate slowly.

Other self-reinforcing processes have been suggested such as through social exclusion and endogeneity of social networks (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2015), mental health (Flechtner, 2014; Moya and Carter, 2019; ?; Ridley et al., 2020; Haushofer, 2019), exposure to violence (Alloush and Bloem, 2022; Moya, 2018), or changes to economics parameters such as planning horizons (Lajaaj, 2017), or risk aversion (Moya, 2018). Other suggest the endogeneity of self-control (Fafchamps et al., 2014) and overall lower than expected investment in high marginal return investments (Duflo, Kremer and Robinson, 2011; Kremer et al., 2013; Schaner, 2018).

In addition, inter-generational models of poverty reinforcing future poverty in different generations have been posited for some time in economics. This can start early as the poor are more likely to experience shocks during pregnancy (Aizer et al., 2016), and living in poverty in early life leads to lower levels of human capital accumulation and health, for a variety of reasons such as malnutrition or child labor (Basu, 1999; Loury, 1981; Bhalotra and Rawlings, 2013; Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens, 2008, 2006; East et al., 2017). In addition, the poor are more likely to experience violent events and environmental shocks and these are shown to have long-term consequences for children (Bharadwaj et al., 2017).

## Appendix D

### Empirical Complexities

Disentangling poverty traps or a conditional state dependence of a certain form is difficult. As discussed in [Barrett and Carter \(2013\)](#) and in [Arunachalam and Shenoy \(2017\)](#),<sup>24</sup> detecting traps at the household or individual level using survey data is difficult for a variety of different reason that include:

1. In large broadly representative samples, we will have heterogeneity. While some might face a proper poverty trap, others in our representative dataset do not. For example, highly skilled individuals will likely succeed no matter what their initial endowment is, while highly unskilled individuals will likely be at a low equilibrium in the longer regardless of their initial asset level. We do not know if groupings exist and we do not know which group an individual belongs to.
2. Even among those who are facing poverty traps, the thresholds where their incomes bifurcate towards low and high equilibria could be endogenous to skills and other relevant often unobservable variables. This household/individual-level heterogeneity makes identifying the threshold difficult. Generally, [Hansen \(2000\)](#) threshold estimation method is usually used to identify poverty trap thresholds ([Carter et al., 2007](#)), however fixed effects threshold estimation methods are not well developed.
3. Some recent tests for household- or individual-level poverty traps rely on asset-based measures. Asset-based approaches are appealing, but they are slow moving and often hard to pin down a proper value for. Asset indices can solve the latter problem, however empirical tests for poverty traps can be sensitive to arbitrary choices made when constructing the asset index ([Michelson, Muiz and DeRosa, 2013](#)).
4. Some tests for multi-equilibrium poverty traps simply try to find multi-modal cross-sectional asset or income distributions ([Quah, 1996](#); [Bianchi, 1997](#)). However, as shown in [Barrett \(2005\)](#) and [Kwak and Smith \(2013\)](#), certain stochastic errors in the data-generating process can produce uni-modal cross-sectional distributions.
5. First, disentangling poverty traps (conditional state dependence of a certain form) is difficult when individual characteristics that may lead to different conditional steady states are themselves endogenous to initial well-being. This is slightly different from

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<sup>24</sup>For a thorough discussion of the issues that make poverty traps difficult to detect empirically see [Barrett and Carter \(2013\)](#).

point 1—even if we are able to perfectly measure a covariate such as ability or self-control; studies have shown these to be endogenous to well-being and can change. This further complicates pinning down a threshold-based poverty trap.

6. There are several different self-reinforcing mechanisms that could create poverty traps: different mechanisms imply different empirical patterns that may all be present.
7. The thresholds determining traps and the resulting equilibria may move over time in response to changing market and non-market conditions and this may vary across individuals.
8. We are usually unable to control for the many small and large shocks individuals and households face. When thinking about data and panels, we have to balance between two things: One, we need enough time for the trap process to make its mark in order for us to observe it. However, with longer panels, the likelihood of shocks increases and the likelihood of changing market and non-market conditions (that change the dynamic process) also increase.
9. *Econometrics-specific reasons:* If, for example, multiple equilibria exist, then one should find few observations in any sample around the threshold. Therefore the resulting asset dynamics might be mistaken for heteroskedastic and positively autocorrelated errors [Barrett \(2005\)](#). This problem is worsened when individuals who identify the out-of-equilibrium dynamics are a non-random sub-sample with unknown selection, and there is non-random attrition.

Given these complexities, it perhaps not surprising that studies seeking to find evidence multi-equilibrium poverty traps have failed. Recent evidence by [Balboni et al. \(2022\)](#) experimentally showing evidence for poverty traps in Bangladesh has renewed the debate on poverty traps.

## Appendix E

### Methods description

In this section we briefly describe four popular methods used in the literature to test for poverty traps.

*Bi-modal distributions*—The simplest of the methods uses the intuition that poverty traps show lead to high and low equilibria and thus bi-modal distributions. In this, draw densities with bandwidths chosen by *Stata*.

*Parametric Methods*—For this method, we estimate a flexible 4-th degree polynomial equation in two different ways. The first is simply using OLS. The second, we use panel data methods proposed by [Arellano and Bond \(1991\)](#) and refined over time by many others to estimate the polynomial equation using information from lagged observations of capital. This GMM approach requires assumptions on the dynamics that are easily met in our simulation, however, can be tricky in real panel data.

*Non-Parametric Methods*—Here we use local linear regressions to estimate the shape of dynamics. Optimal bandwidths are chosen automatically through *Stata*.

*Probability of Negative Growth*—As suggested by [Arunachalam and Shenoy \(2017\)](#), we run a regression where our dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating a decrease in capital over the relevant time period (negative growth). Our regressors are dummy variables for the baseline decile one belongs to (with no constant). We plot the estimated coefficients.